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The spectacle of thousands of British subjects
kept permanently in the position of helots, con-
stantly chafing under undoubted grievances, and
calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for
redress, does steadily undermine the influence and
reputation of Great Britain and the respect for
the British Government in its own dominions. 1
In this, the famous 'helot telegram', Milner was careful to present the
Uitlanders of the Witwatersrand as a unified, aggrieved community which
eagerly pressed him to involve _the British colonial government in the
domestic affairs of the South African Republic. This portrait of the
Uitlanders is not unique, for the vast majority of official cables originat-
ing in southern Africa, as well as the Reformers1 published writings presented
a picture of an oppressed British community, irrevocably joined together in
its struggle to eliminate a variety of practices — enumerated as "grievances"
and to win the Republican franohise. Most political historians since that
time have adopted this view of the Rand community, which has encouraged their
acceptance of the Colonial Office's account of the grievance agitation and
the local cause of the Boer War. Consequently, too many of us were taught
this version as students.
But there is another view of the Uitlander community, and one whbh Milner
and his subordinates Knew to be true. Only a month before Milner sent his
•helot telegram1, he received a confidential report of the situation from
the British Agent in the Republic, Conyngham Greenes
The truth is that the Uitlanders of Johannesburg
are lacking now, as before, in Cohesion, and it
is impossible to hope to hold them, for an indef-
inite interval, together. This was the case at the
Raid time.... The same influence is at work today....
PBople here are of so many nationalities, interests,
occupations and even feelings, that you cannot
expect lasting cohesion from them. 2
Bat In order to gain the support of the British press and government, and the
sympathy of the British public, Milner had to ensure that this view of
the Witwatersrand was suppressed and that the Uitlanders appeared instead as
a uniformly oppressed and outraged community. Any dissenting opinion had
to be hidden behind a veil of silence, if it could not be out-right eliminated,
Milner and his colleagues did this in three ways* first In his reports to
England, Milner presented a one-sided picture of the situation on the Rand
and biased accounts of the views of the Uitlanders. Secondly, he attempted
to unify the Uitlanders on certain issues and encouraged them to form
organisations led by men who Milner felt already knew what was needed.
Finally, he and these men, the Reformers, tried to quash any independent
Uitlander movement which either opposed British intervention in the Transvaal
or was out-right pro-Boer- As history attests, Milner and his colleagues
were more than a little successful.
No matter where one begins an investigation of the Uitlanders — whether "by
looking at their spatial distribution and life styles, their ethnic and
national differences, their religious and social affiliations or their class
interests — it is clear that theirs was not an homogeneous community. Though
one generally assumes that the Uitlanders were British, there were on the Rand
a large number of Continental Europeans, Australians and Americans. Their
housing and leisure time activities'as well as their children's access to
schooling reflected class differences which originated in occupational roles.
Class and nationality were the'two most divisive factors within the Uitlander
society in the I89OS and both took on political meaning as war approached.
One manifestation of the heterogeneity of the community was the organisations
which had regional, national or cultural identity as their focus and which
maintained the vitality of national allegiance. Their social function was
to Taring immigrants together who enjoyed taking part in activities from home.
For instance, the Cambrian Society's "Eisteddfod" or the Swiss Society's
Helvetian Independence Day celebrations served to draw people together who
might have had nothing else in common other than their origins. These clubs
also served as benevolent societies, quasi-labour organisations, and a few
had explicit ly political functions. While these Htmic-based organisations
served to bridge class differences, they did keep nationalist sentiment alive.
Tracing class divisions within the Uitlander community before the war is not
much more difficult than determining the occupation of the members of this
society. Tracing class consciousness takes more time, which may account for
the belief amongst some historians that it did not exist before the Boer War.
Certainly, though, an awareness of class interests was present amongst the
Uitlander workers as the number of strikes increased after I896 and as
the depression settled upon the community. The depression, which began
in I897 and which only partially eased before the war, put strains upon
the society, polarising the Uitlander community and fostering class conflict.
As political tension mounted, these strains took on political meaning.
The Rand Lords argued in the press, before the I897 Industrial Commission and
to the British government that the depression was caused ty Kruger's economic
and political policies. The Reformers echoed this sentiment in their publications
and from public platforms. The High Commissioner and his subordinates took
up the cry. On the other hand, many amongst the Uitlander working class
formulated their own explanation.
The pro-Republican and anti-capitalist Johannesburg newspaper, the Standard
and Diggers' News, argued that the depression waa caused "by "artificial means-11
The "big houses" had. In its opinion, agreed to halt the flow of funds to
Rand industries
 f thereby creating a "heart sickening decline from day to
day" so that the "small man" would be forced to sell out and larger concerns
could buy up bankrupt companies. This argument appealed to the working man
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as well.
Glass conscious Ultlander workers felt that the depression was also used
er
by the owners as an excuse to loV^hlte wages. One of the clearest statements
of this position was made some time lateri
The director of one of the great mining groups,
talking to me ... in the summer of I897, was
almost brutal In his franknesst- *We have settled
the question of native labour •. • • We have now
the more difficult problem of white labour before
us. I don't at all approve of suddenly reducing
wages, and so producing a strike. This is In every
way undesirable. What we have to do is to shut
down some of our poorer mines, and let the men walk
about the streets for two or three months until their
feet are on pavement. They'll be glad enough then
to take*4atever we may choose to offer then."^"
Such suspicions gained credibility during the depression as mines were closed,
as owners — notably J.B. Robinson — attempted to lower white wages, and
as attempts were made to raise productivity with no commensurate increase
in wages — through the 'two machine* movement, for instance. Any attempts
to lengthen hours, or replace white with cheaper non-white labour farther
reinforced this view.
IB various sectors of the economy the use of non-white labour was advanced
during the depression. For Instance, engine drivers on some mines complained
that "coolies" were being hired to replace whites and that the owners
were trying to get "engine drivers' certificates granted to coloured persons —
Kafirs." ^  Hotel employees fought against the introduction of blacks as porters
while unionised prlntere were opposed to the introduction of blacks in the
print shop, though with little success in these years.
The bakers, like other whites, argued against the introduction of non-white
workers during these deptression years. In mid-1898, for instance, one baker
reported that though it was illegal, "Kafirs are used for mixing dough,
whereas whites are working at the oven and baking bread." He explained
that because the "kafirs worked cheaper," they were "liked by the bosses."
His contusion, like that of many others, was that the "natural consequence is
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that many white people are out of work and on the point of starvation."
It is difficult to determine whether non-whites were actually being hired to
replace white workers directly in an attempt to lower labour costs during the
depression. But one thing is clear: white labourers thought so. Hence,
the depression served to highlight the use of cheaper, non-white labour
just because so many whites were unemployed. This did little to endear the
employer or the non-white competitor to the unemployed or defensive white
workers.
Not surprisingly, then, at the I898 Transvaal Typographical Society banquet
a guest from the Ehgine Drivers' Association rose to toast Kruger and remark
that "there is no Government on the face of the earth more ready to give working
Q
men their due than the Transvaal Government." This view summed up the feelings
of a good many trade unionists and white artisans on the Rand before the war.
I&rt of the reason they liked Kruger was because of the ease with which
organised labour was able to approach the Pretoria government. Also, Kruger
was seen as the friend of the white workers in their battle against bosses
and non^rhite competitors.
For instance
 v in I896 Kruger had approved of legislation which theoretically
gave engine drivers protection against non-white competitors on the mines.
Similarly, non-whites were not allowed to handle explosives. White miners
were not ungrateful for Republican protection, as may be seen by the letter
written by one miner to the South African Mining Jovccna.lt
I must say it is a good thing for the white miner
that the Transvaal Government recognised the dif-
ference between the Kaffir and his white brother,
as you are pleased to call him, and for which they
will have the support of all the working men on
the Rand, especially the white miners. I make
no doubt the miner would have been working for
starvation wages long before this if the capital-
ists of Johannesburg had their own sweet will. I
make no doubt that the Kaffir would have been tried
in the place of white men long ago if it had not
been for the timely action of the Government in
making it impossible for them to hold responsible
positions. 9
Such sentiment had profound political implications when the agitation for
the Republican franchise was at its height in the year or so before the war.
Theq the workers feared the changes in legislation which would follow if
the bosses were to achieve political power in the Republic. Flirther,
they were affcaid of what might happen in the white workers were to receive
the vote. They were concerned that if Uitlanders were enfranchised, the
working class would be forced to register and vote for specified candidates.
F6r instance, in Kay I899 one worker told the Standard and Diggers' News
that not "one in a thousand" Uitlanders wanted the vote, for if they had it
the "big houses" would compel their people to register and the "capitalists"
would then "run the men they wish for the constituency, and put pressure
upon all hands ... to support their candidate," He warned that anyone doing
otherwise would be told "voetsac" by the boss. Another immigrant warned
that if enfranchised, workers would be "sounded individually, like we were
at Broken Hill Australia/.fl The end result, he feared, would be the fall
• ' 1
of the Republic into the "hands of the capitalist to be used for himself
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against us..." Such views were commonly expressed by class conscious
Uitlanders in the year or so before the war.
Class conflict, then, was intimately related to racialism and to political
antagonism, and the study of any one of these topics cannot ignore the other.
But our purpose here is to emphasize that class conflict did exist before
the war, and that it, like nationalist sentiment, kept the Uitlander com-
munity from becoming that unified, aggrieved society which Milner so frequently
wrote Home about.
As the depression deepened, political tension escalated. Consequently,
Milner and his Reformers tried to overcome the divisions within the
community and to generate grist for Hilner's political mill. In order to
do so, the Beformers created two organisations, the South African league
and the Uitlander Council. Much has been written about these groups and
about the outcome of their efforts, "but little has been written about the
means they pursued to generate pro-British propaganda and to suppress
pro-Boer activity.
Not surprisingly, the class basis of the reform movement was bourgeois.
J.P. Fitzpatrick and Samuel Evans, for instance, were powerful figures in
the mining industry, while J.W. Quinn and William Hosken were important local
"business men. Lawyers, such as J.D, Forster and H.C. Hull, played an important
role, as did the journalist-editors, Monypenny and Pakeman.
The baclqground, training and position of men such as these led them to advocate
a form of government which aided the growth of modem industry. Anomolies,
such as customs barriers which inhibited the movement of goods, restrictions
which hindered the reduction of working costs
 f bribery and corruption which
made good laws unenforceable and religious scruples which were used to Justify
archaic practices and which limited the full utilisation of capital, labour
and equipment must have seemed frightful burdens to these men*
Similarly, lax enforcement of legislation lurposefully enacted to ensure the
efficient and effective administration of the city, district and industry no
doubt frustrated those who had been trained to repeal the law and to strive
for excellence. Those who believed that British culture could bring beneficial
change to the Rejublic must have felt disgust with what was seen as rule too
personal, too corrupt, and too inefficient. Their goaLwas to bring what in
their view was efficiency and order to the economic and political life of the
Republic, In this, their views paralleled Milner's.
The functions, activities,'tRough not the goals, of the South African League
and the Ultlander Council were quite different • The former was ae«mt to
generate, harness and channel popular itf-tlander discontent with the Republican
regime, while the latter was to advise the colonial government on elite Uit-
lander opi nion, and, ultimately, to mastermind, in conjunction with Hilner,
the escalation of ptressure on the Republican government. This is not to say
that the League was a democratic organisation, for its very structure — with
the same men rotating posts in the executive from year to year, and with an
organisation which ensured that decisions were made and orders given by the
executive in Johannesburg — precluded uncontrolled, spontaneous activity by
common members. For Instance, in times of crisis the executive cancelled
meeting in outlying branches in order to keep the members from vocalising
opinions which might be an embarrassment to Milner.
The advent of the Uitlander Council was closely related to the Jameson Raidj
the public appearance of the Council was timed to coincide with the expiration
of the three year ban on political activity by the Raid conspirators. This
is not to say that the Reformers had not been active before this date, for
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aeHilner was told earlier, the "best men" were doing Ma good deal sub rosa."
Still, the Council supposedly grew out of a public meeting of concerned
l&tlandera, and Council members were supposedly chosen by the public. Yet,
a careful reading of reports shows that the leadership was, in fact, self-
selected and that the representatives who were supposedly 'elected* were
in fact nominated by men on the platform and "agreed to" by spectators at
various meetings. Because its membership was, by and large, made up of
powerful industrial and mining men, and because Milner's men were in close
contact with its leaders from the beginning, it was the more powerful of the
two organisations. Still, both served his purposes.
Anyone familiar with the Boer War has heard of the Edgar Affair (which,
mercifully, won't be discussed here) as well as the famous Uitlander petition
with some 20,000 signatures for the Queen. The idea of this petition
originated with Fltzpatrlck, after a previous one with **O signatures purporting
to represent several thousand Uitlandess met with a rebuff from Milner's
standrin at the time, General William Butler. After the Queen's petition
reached Great Britain, Milner sent word to Fitzpatrick not to let the
agitation "fizzle", while other Reformers were warned by Milner's secretary,
13G.V, Flddes, to "keep steadily though quietly pegging away." J They took
their directions seriously, and a number of meetings along the reef were
then organised try the South African League.
These meetings served Milner's purpose well. The Star reported them fully,
though the Standard and Diggers' News had little to say about them other than
that they were poorly attended and being used to stir up trouble by the League.
Naturally* it was the Star's reports which made it to England. And, the speeches
nade on the platforms were Just the sort of propaganda Milner needed to send
home. But, what was not reported in Britain was the way the speakers pandered
to class antagonisms in their attempt to gain support for the reform movement.
Generally any speaker — and none was identified as being a League member,
though all followed the League's line — began by telling the Uitlander
workers who attended these meetings on the mines that they were just like
"kaffirs" t they lived without the "true status of manhood11 and had become the
"laughing stock of European powers." The speaker then told the audience
that the Uitlanders1 struggle was not just the bosses' battle, but one that
the workers ought to take an interest in as wellj had not the Rand lords in
ed
their meetings with ffiruger not remember/that the workers1 interests were
paramount?
Some speakers argued that once the Uitlanders were enfranchised, the working
class — and not the capitalists — would dominate the Transvaal. One argued
that they had nothing to fear from the reform leaders, for it would be easier
for the labouring class to "make terms with the financier than with the
Government." Further, with the secret ballot, the workers could vote for
whomever they wanted. •*
At a few of these meetings, men were 'elected' to join the Uitlander Council.
This served the purpose of making it appear as though the Council had actually
been created in public, by outraged Uitlanders, rather than in private by
the Rand Lords with Milner *s encouragement. These meetings, then, like the
Edgar demonstrations and the Queen's petition served as propaganda for Milner
to iteed the British public.
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Similarly, the grievance agitation was well publicised in Britain. We all
have read about the so-called grievances, such as the high cost of dynamite,
the concessionaire companies, the customs duties on industrial and urban
consumer goods, the poor education for Uitlander children (and in the Dutch
medium as well), the restricted franchise, etc. It was the League which kept
these grievancws before the public, and which made sure that M^lner was
never without information about them to send to England.
But a study of the grievances has shown that in no case was much more than
a small section of the Uitlander population upset "by the practices of the
government. In many cases, such as with the dynamite price, it took alot
of effort on the part of the Reformers to make an issue appear to be one of
common concern. And many of the more widespread complaints, such as about
the children's education, were class based, in this case, for instance,
most
very few working men had families in residence and/^rere, therefore, apathetic
about the eduction issue. Instead, it was men who had put down roots in
the Transvaal, and who had families with them — business men and industrial
supervisors and the like — who were most apt to be concerned.
But even with an issue which had some amount of popular support, such as the
issue of education, there were those who dissented. For instance, the Clifton
Methodists of Braamfontein were quite satisfied with the government's educational
plan — much to the disgust of the Reformers. So was the Welsh vice-Master
of President School in Johannesburg. But neither of these was given a fair
hearing in London. Their reports to the Colonial Office were accompanied by
letters from Milner and the Iteformers which threw doubt on their credibility.
In the end the Colonial Office believed its representatives and the Reformers1
education expert, J.P. Fltzpatrick.
-12=
Che of the least likely grievances — considering the racialism rampant
on the Band — was the one which had the Inlanders expressing dissatisfaction
with the way the Boer government treated non-«hites. In the years before the
war, Iretorla had attempted to conscript Gape Coloureds for service in the
commandos, had tried to keep all non-whites in urban locations, had sought
to create a new location some miles from the city, and had tried to restrict
Asian trading in the city. In most cases, the Boers had the full support
of the Ultlanders resident on the Rand. Hence, it should be cause to wonder
why the Reformers included the Boers* treatment of non«whites in their list
of grievances.
Milner wanted to use the treatment of non-whites as part of his case against
the Kruger regime — possibly because it would be sure to gain support in
Ehgland. But, because of the Uitlanders1 racialism, he had to muzzle them
and this meant getting the Reformers and press in line. In fact, this is what
Flddes was sent to do in early I899.
When on the Rand, Milner's secretary met with the leaders of the Reform movement
and at dinner they spoke at length about the political situation. Flddes
later reported to Milner that
having gotthem in good humour and shewn that I was
at least sympathetic, I put the question 1 'As
regards Indians and Gape Boys. I know you don't love
them much, and I know that there is something to be
said on your side which I am sure H.M.G. would take
into count if properly approuched. But the T.V. ^ Sr
vaal7 don*t approach us properly. I may tell you in
strict confidence (I always like to tell people open
secrets in strict confidence) that at any moment this
question might assume serious shape. Now, if H.M.G.
made their minds that it was necessary to take a firm
stand on it, would Johannesburg be likely to take up
a hostile or embarrassing attitude on it?1
Not surprisingly, they "bounded on their seats," and "simply chorused:
'Certainly not. Any stick is good enough to beat ftuil Kruger with, and
though we don't love the Indians, we wouldn't say a wordy and we would use
our influence for all its worth to prevent others from saying a word against
you,'" On the same visit, Flddes made sure that the editors of the Star
and Transvaal leader, Messrs. Monypenny and Vak emanf respectively, would
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"strike the right note," f Unity amongst the Reformers on this issue —
for the time being, at least — was thus assured.
But Milner and the Reformers were not always so fortunate as to be on the
offensive % sometimes they had to fight rear-guard actions. For instance,
when Milner was in aigland, the Acting High Commissioner, Sir William Butler,
decided he would send a report to the Colonial Office about the Reformers.
In it he labelled them capitalists and noted that they had stage-managed
the Edgar agitation. Upon his return, Milner had to expend some amount of
energy and time trying to change this impression.
later the credibility of the Queen's petition was called into question. The
Standard and Diggers' News spearheaded a campaign to discredit it "by printing
letters from readers who cited cases of fraud. For instance, cases of dupli-
cated and triplicated signatures were reported, and while the league stated
that only British citizens over the age of sixteen were allowalto sign,
instances of youngsters signing it were noted. Cases of women signing their
husbands1 names, and of people signing it without knowing what it was about
were recorded in the press. In other instances, men stated that they signed
it in order to "retain their billets." 1 8
Soon a Republican Green Book appeared. It presented affidavits swearing
to a variety of other infractions. Milner was forced to defend the League and
its petition, which he did to the satisfaction of the Colonial Office. At
the same time he did not fail to mention that the petition was the work of
the League and not the capitalists.
Again, in August I899, the Reformers were placed on the defensive, but this
time by the management of the Robinson Deep, owned by the Consolidated Gold
Fields. The manager there tried to lengthen^the work day of his ground level
white workers fr?om nine to ten hours, A strike of 150 or so men ensued, *
which threatened to spread along the reef. This action obviously did not demon-
strate Uitlander unity or the friendship which capital supposedly had for labour.
Hence, the League was forced to criticise the "high-handud action" of the
directors of the Robinson Deep. While apologising for Interfering in the
concerns of employer-employee — and, indeed, It was a unique action for the
League, but illustrative of the importance this strike had for Uitlander political
unity — the League felt that it was in error for the company to "take advantage
of the present period of /economic/ distress" to introduce new hours.
Undoubtedly the Standard and Diggers' News was correct in assuming that
the League, now cast as the "Friend of the Working Kan," was of the opinion
that "a quarrel between man and master would not suit the /purpose/ ... of
the League Just now." Indeed, the Star argued that the strike was only an
"Isolated action" and should not be allowed to impair the "harmony and
unanimity of all classes of uitlander people..." As the engine drivers
threatened to walk out and with the fear growing that a general movement
for a reduction of hours would ensue, the management capitulated. The Reformers
gave a sigh of relief and the Mining Journal reported that the "danger of a
growing feud between labour and capital at this most critical juncture" had
19been avoided. 7
The Reformers also had to concern themselves with organisations with pronounced
pro-Boer tendencies. And, there were amongst the Uitlanders In these years
groups which were becoming increasingly sympathetic to the KrUger government.
In April I899 at least two different groups of pro-Boers circulated petitions
on the Rand, both addressed to Kruger and denotnc&jg the league's principles
and petition. One asked for the liberalisation of the franchise law as well
as other laws, but expressed a desire for peace and good will between Uitlander
and Boer, The second was more pointed, accusing the organisers of the Queen's
petition of being Mcapitalists and not the public." It added that in the opinion
of the signatories, the Republican government had no major "faults" but if it
had, and any grievances were to result, they could not be resolved by the inter-
20
vention of any foreign government or the "advice of the capitalists."
No sooner had the second of these counter-petitions been conceptualised than
the Reformers took action. A copy of it was stolen from the printers and leaked
to the press before it was circulated. It was than attacked by Greene who
stated that it was "generally discredited" for it was no secret, he claimed,
that Its 9,000 signatures were obtained through the instrumentality of govern-
ment officials and railway workers, and that neither group was representative
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of the Uitlanders. The Star adopted this line and printed a letter stating
that the petition had been signed by illicit liquor dealers, because the author-
ities were kind to them, illicit gold buyers, railway employees, "tinder pain
of dismissal," indigent Boers and six hundred or so "continental peoples."
Finally, reports were sent to Milner which testified to the duplicity of
22the canvassers in obtaining signatures for the counter-petition.
In August another petition was circulated which stated that the signatories
were not interested in taking up the franchise, tfie League took steps im-
mediately and warned off potential signatories by stating that by signing
23it they might render themselves liable for military service. -^
Earlier, in May I899, a resolution was forwarded through Milner *s office to
Chamberlain, It read:
although we hold that there are many legitimate
grievances, and there is urgent need for reform in
many directions, we are yet of ^ hhe/ opinion that there
are no grievances here which could justify any extreme
measures on the part of Her Majesty *s Government.
It was signed by the vice president and the secretary of the Federated Building
Trades Council, the presidents, vice presidents and secretaries of the Wit-
watersrand ftdnters and Decorators1 Union, the Transvaal Ehgine Utivers'
Association and the Iron Moulders' Union — all uitlander organisations —
as well as the Chief Ranger and secretary of the Irish National Foresters
Benefit Society. Nonetheless, the Colonial Secretary did not receive the
resolution without prejudice, for Milner and Greene made sure that the instigator
was discredited as an "anti-imperialist and advanced Irish nationalist •"
Another example of radical working class support for the Boer government was
the International Independent Labour Rtrty (IILP). It has been argued
that because of its socialist platform, the post-war successor of the IILP
was not well-received by the Rand electorate- But the same cannot be stated
so certainly regarding the pre-war party. First, it never contested an
election, and secondly .and more importantly, while its principles and leader-
ship were broadly socialist, its immediate concerns as well as the causes it
expounded were not. Further, during its short-lived career it was attacked
more for its anti-British stance than for its socialist principles.
The goal of the IILP was the "equitable distribution of wealth" and the elev-
ation of the "moral and intellectual standard" of its members. It opposed
special privilege, advocated a Republican form of government and sought some
sort of local self-government for the Rand. It advocated the nationalisation of
property, including the mines, the abolition of monopolies and called for
public ownership and control of public works. It intended to achieve its
goal of promoting and protecting the welfare of the white working class through1
=17-
legislation and "by improving the conditions of labour* securing an eight hour
work day and a trade union rate of wages, abolishing all. unnecessary Sunday
labour on the mines, obtaining one man-one vote with no property qualification
or religious disqualification, and prohibiting the importation of contract labour.
The IILP was clearly South African In its conception, for its goal was the
religious, political and social equality of white people only, and it sought
the maintenance of the Republic as a "white man's country." J
In an effort to create this workers* utopla, its tactics were quite ordinaryi
the collection and distribution of data relevant to labourers, communication
with other labour organisations, the establishment of a library and a meeting
place for party members. From Pretoria it wanted articles of incorporation
as a political party, and the passage of any legislation which would ameliorate
2.6
the conditions of white workers.
The IILP began in I899 with a meeting of a few working men, chaired "by J.T.
Bain, At this meeting, in the same month as the League's meetings along the
reef, it was resolved to hold a mass meeting to form an "Association to pro-
tect the interest of workmen on the Witwatersrand." From this time until the
party's drift into relative obscurity, chaos reigned. Conflicts centred
upon personalities as well as the party's criticism of the Rand capitalists.
Throughout the early phase of its existence, an unruly element attended
party meetings. IILP leaders suspected that this disruptive group had been
sent by the Reformers who wanted the movement to fail. The men in attendence
were vociferous in their opposition to any anti-capitalist or anti-British
speaker and soon they focused on Bain, one of the most outspoken Boer supporters
and a long-time Rand labour leader. The dissidents were successful at the
•18-
first meeting i little business was conducted due to interruptions from the
floor and speakers were denied a hearing. Eventually the disorderly persons
were ejected from the hall*
A moderate
 r Mr. Hall, was elected to the chair and he insisted that speakers
temper their anti-capitalist diatribes, confine themselves to the immediate
issues and not wander into what he considered side-issues. Needless to say,
many labourers present did not consider capitalist exploitation of the working
class and the capitalists1 machinations in the Transvaal to be side-issues
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as he did. After further diSBention, he was removed from the chair. '
The second meeting, in June I899, was just as disorderly, though this time
the fracas was confined to the audience, for the leadership did not make the
mistake of allowing another moderate to chair the meeting. With constant
interruptions from the floor, the business of presenting and adopting the
party's principles took a long time. Anti- capitalist speeches were interrupted
by hecklers shouting 'rats*, which then led to further commotion* The audience
as a whole supported the leadership and speakers, though a disruptive element
(along with a few sober and moderate labourers) gave the audience little chance
of hearing a coherent arguement. The introduction of contemporary politics
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was opposed by the most vociferous members of the audience.
They also spoke out against the "socialist" speech of Mr, Grauss. a "socialist
of repute" and the leader of the local Vorwaertz Society, the organisation of
German Social Democrats 1
The success of the toiling masses meant the
prosperity of, any country. It was not the
Transvaal burgjhers, or the Government, who
were their enemies.... It was the monopolists
of the mining industry who were causing all
the trouble. 29
1.0-
The historian Grobler has stated J that the people in attendence were
primarily opposed to the radical Bain and the socialist platform of the IILP.
But it is not as..simple as that, for the so-called socialism which found ex-
pression at the meeting was generally concerned with the local political
crisis and was openly critical of the Rand Lords. In fact, most socialist
theory was lost in the heated exchanges concerning the Boer-British struggle •
Further, It was precisely because of its pro-Boer stance that the IILP
became the focal point of criticism. It was denounced as a socialist organ-
isation partly In the hope of discrediting it with less radical workers.
Certainly Bain's stand as a republican rather than a socialist generated
more criticism at the June I899 meeting. When the fact was made Known by some-
one in the audience that Bain had advocated at the time of the Raid the
hanging of Dr. Jameson and his "raiders", It brought cries of "traitor" from
some in attendence. His speech which followed and which was meant to clarify
his position in early I896 was constantly interrupted and soon he gave up,
with the meeting drawing to a close as the rowdiest element led the singing
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of 'God Save the Queen1.
The proposed July meeting demonstrated the power of the Uitlander elite. That
meeting was scheduled to be held at the Wanderers' arena, but the executive
of the Wanderers1 Club successfully barred the IILP's use of the facility.
There were also rumours that the League had made plans to wreck the meeting if
held. It had to be postponed while the IILP sent a deputation to Pretoria
32to ask the government to investigate the matter.
Hie campaign against Bain had been well organised, with the press joining in
after the second meeting. Finally at the end of July he was forced to resign
from the party executive because the press's smear tactics were hurting the
party. His resignation as well as the "futile endeavour" of the IILP to hold a
mass meeting at the Wanderers were regarded as another "triumph of the
33tyrant Capital*" Thereafter the party continued the struggle, though
it lost a great dedl of momentum with Bain's departure. Yet in his absence
it could get down to serious work and it was only at this point that its
successful struggle for legislation for the eight hour work day began.
The Reformers' press and the Rand lords vociferously opposed the Eight
Hour Movement, None the less, the principle of an eight hour work day
was adopted by the Republican Raad in September 1899 and a Mil was drafted*
Had the war not intervened, the Bill should have become law and the IILP
would have had its first victory. The Kruger regime was to the end the friend
and protector of the white working class.
Though the paid up membership 6f the IILP was quite small—130 in August
I899 J— it reflected the views of the more radical element of the remainder
of the white working class. It did wield some power and had influence in
Pretoria and as a result, its leadership was hounded "by the pro-British
Uitlanders. Because it endeavoured to expound the cause.of white labour
and was to some extent successful, because it was allied with the Itetoria
government in an attempt to achieve its goals, because it was well advertised
in the local pro-Boer press, and because its very nature was to divide the
Uitlander population, it was a prime opponent of those who conspired to oust
the Pretoria regime. For those reasons, its activities, goals and membership -
in fact, its very existence — were scareely reported at Home.
In the months preceding the war, opposition to British intervention generated
by nationalist sentiment became more widespread. C^ubs which had ethnicity
as their focus were the basis of this political activity. Many of the Irish
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clubs had had an explicit political function for some time. This Irish
nationalism gave r ise to support of the Boers, For instance, when in I897
Kruger banned the Star, one Irishman noted he had no sympathy for the paper,
for the treatment meted out to it was less severe than that handed out by
the British in Ireland. Naturally, as the political situation worsened, a
comparison between the Boer and Irish nations was inevitable, as both were
being tormented by British Imperialists,
Anglophobia amongst continental Europeans on the Band was transformed into
Republican sympathy as well. The Germans were probably the most outspokenly
sympathetic to the Republic, having been given their lead some years earlier
by the •Kruger telegram', though KrUger's boasting of his German descent
probably helped as well. Business competition between British and German
entrepreneurs on the Rand played a significant role while the working class
Germans who belonged to the Vorwaerts Society had class-based reasons for
37their support. ^ f
Other Europeans, particularly Hollanders, spoke out in favour of the Republic,
Even the normally apolitical Scandinavians became increasingly vociferous.
And though the pro-British press maintained that the American community sup-
ported the Uit3»nder struggle for representation, it is clear that many Americans
did not. Even the American Consul was suspected by the British of being a
Boer sympathizer.
By September such support had become more meaningful to the Republicans!
volunteer forces began seriously recruiting about this time. The reasons
given by pro-Boer activists demonstrate the fact that their sympathy
had grown out of both class antagonism to the Rand I/jrds, and nationalist
ardour.
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On the 16th of September, Bain called a meeting on Market Square to make an
appeal for the enrollment of volunteers for the Boer forces. The meeting
had to be cancelled because of the size and "turbulence11 of the "mob". Bain
claimed that the men had been hired by the Reformers in order to keep him
39from speaking, a charge never proven. Even though he was refused a hearing,
volunteers began to organise.
Bain himself served as a recruiter for the First Irish Brigade, formed in
early September. The reasons which motivated its members to join were
outlined In its "Irish Manifesto". After a discussion of the Raid — which it
said had been instigated by a "msmber of the Queen's Privy Council"— the
manifesto went on to point out that a "number of English capitalists"
along with this un-named cabinet minister, had continued their scheming*
now bringing the two countries to war. The depth of their hatred for the
Ehgllsh government, their primary reason for joining the Boers, is notable.
The manifesto readt
Irishmen i The Transvaal Boers have fought
and bravely won their Independence, You have
seen in your own country the effects of English
rulei you have seen your fathers, your mothers,
and your sisters suffer In themselves and in
their children, poverty, nakedness, hunger,
misery and oppression of the most dreadful
kinds. You know that Qiglish rule has left
your country desolate, and driven her children
forth, homeless and penniless, to all the ends
of the earth. You know that during those sixty
years of Queen Victoria's reign, one and a half
millions of your countrymen and women have perish-
ed of starvationI ... You know all of this, you
have seen all of this, and we ask you, in the
presence of the terrible apparition of your own
perishing country, whether you are going to help
bring the /same/ curse upon the Transvaal?
Vengencel Irishmen I ^ °
A Scandinavian Corps, growing out of the local club, was formed later that
month. The reasons for its support of the Boers were presented "by
E. Olsen-Mandalh. After reviewing the liberation struggles of the nordic
people, he outlined the Scandinavians* views
Can we Scandinavians , with such a record, stand
back ... and see the dearly-bought independence
of this country taken away? look at the ways
and means used during the last years by the capi-
talists and their tools to ruin the country* **-
In the month or so before the war a number of Uitlander volunteer corps
were formed. There was a Russian unit, a French Corps (which guarded the
mines), a Jewish commissariat committee, an Italian Scouting Corps, two
Irish Brigades, an American Scouts, a Hollander Corps as well as the
largest of the volunteer unite, the German Corps.
By the beginning of war, then, many non-British Uitlanders had displayed in
a very tangible and meaningful way their sympathy for the Boer government
and their dislike of the British, Their anglophobia was in a large part
based upon their distrust of the Rand Lords, their fear of capitalist rule,
as well as their own nationalist sympathies.
Meanwhile along the coast the British Uitlanders were beginning to become
a burden to the colonial administration. J During the war most remained
politically apathetic, but suspicious of the machinations of Milner and his
Reformer advisors, vociferously "anti-capitalist" and not in the least interested
in serving in the British volunteer corps. Instead, they expected the British
Imperial government, which received donations from local committees at Home,
to support them until such time as they could return to work on the Rand,
A few of the most radical British Uitlanders, such as E.B. Rose and J.T. Bain,
remained in the Transvaal, openly and actively assisting the Republican cause.
Hundreds of other British workers remained on the Rand, working in the mines
and other industries, which was of great assistance to the Boers' war effort —
much to the disgust of Milner and his Reformers.
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In the five years before the Boer War, the Hefoimers sought to create an
efficient industrial economy and to bring order and British culture to the
Transvaal. Hilner's assistance was essential to their success, for without
him theii grievances would have remained obscure and their cause little
known. In order to Initiate such fundamental change, though, it was necessary
to take a hard line with Kruger. In order to Justify this position, Milner
needed the support — or at least the appearance of support — of the mass
of Uitlanders.
Real unity, though, was difficult to achieve and almost impossible to maintain
for any length of time. The Uitlanders were not homogeneous and their varied
origins, class positions and interests, as well as their mobility and dis-
illusionment with Transvaal politics made them resistant to unification.
By I897 there were concrete divisions within the Uitlander elite, based on
differing political and economic interests. Also, as industrial unrest became
more frequent after I896, class conscious Uitlander workers were increasingly
unlikely to follow capitalist-led political organisations.
In other words, inter-class and Intra-class conflict hindered the Reformers'
cause while industrial unrest and class-based organisations, such as the HLP,
undermined their efforts to create the illusion of mass support for the
Reformers and Milner's politics. But, since the appearance of unity was all
that was needed, even a signature on a petition could be used to bolster the
agitators* position and to support their contention that the overwhelming
majority of Uitlanders was aggrieved by Kruger's act inns.
In order to create this illusion of unity, economic conflict was not widely
reported. None the less, it existed, and was fostered by the I897-99 depression
which compelled employers to reduce their working costs. Work stoppages
resulted when they cut wages, introduced piece work, or tried to replace
expensive white workers with cheaper, generally black, labour.
After the war, when the capitalists had gained political power, the workers1
fears were realised. For instance, employers were in a much better position
to lower real wages and to replace white with non-white workers. The Uitlander
working class — despite the deportation of a number of class conscious
labourers during the war — did not accept its position passively, but sought
to regain some of its power. As the Kruger government fell, organised labour
lost an ally. It tried unsuccessfully to recruit another by asking Milner and
Chamberlain for support. Failing this, the workers used the revitalised trade
unions to organise industrial action when faced by worsening conditions. They
also joined together to pursue class-based and racialist political goals.
For instance, in August 1902 the leadership of the Uitlander working class
outlined several demands which reflected its roots in the Rand, its class
awareness, its racialism, and its pre-war struggles. The workers wanted
white male suffrage, the secret ballot, payment of members of the legislature,
government administration of public services, free, secular and compulsory
education, and electoral districts divided equally amongst the white population*
They also championed the eight hour day for government employees, the end to
"sweating" and the "subletting" system of work, a variety of health and safety
measures for the mines, compulsory arbitration of labour disputes, and minimum
wages for blacks and whites. They also advocated a graduated income tax on
all earnings over £ 500 per year, a tax on land irrespective of improvements,
prohibition of Asiatic labour importation, and they upheld the "unalienable
right of the people to the unearned increment of all." ^ In other words,
class divisions had not evaporated in the heat of battle.
From the time the Uitlaader Council was created until the early reconstruction
period the Rand capitalists managed to push their differences into the bacfc-
ground and to unite behind Milner# Before the war they served as organisers
and propagators of publicity. During the war they served as advisors and
as leaders of the refugee committees along the coast. Their participation
gave credence to the belief that all of the Uitlanders were well represented
before the High Commissioner.
But the causes of conflict were too deep seated to suppress, and the result
was that conflict, discontent and alternative organisations burst forth from
the midst of Uitlander society to shatter that illusion of unity. Before the
war attempts were made to crush such opposition, to discredit its leaders,
and to suppress its representations. During the war, attempts were made
to subvert the opposition, to co-opt its leaders, and to ignore its represent-
ations. In both cases, the Reformers and Milner were mostly successful.
Hence, the view which predominated then, and which has been passed on in history
texts since, was that the Uitlanders were by and large solidly behind Milner
and they were joined together as one community to seek the assistance of the
Imperial government in their struggle against the tyrant Kruger*
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